Human rights claims vs. the state: is sovereignty really eroding?
Chandra Lekha Sriram
“Courts throughout the world can be a forum in which people can assert the primacy of
their human rights in all situations in which states are impeding the realization of those
rights.” –Anthony D’Amato1
Introduction
Human rights theorists and advocates have often suggested that the increased role
and standing of the individual in international law, and the possibility within some human
rights regimes that the individual can bring suit against her own state for its internal actions,
is systematically undermining sovereignty, or that sovereignty itself has had to be reconceptualized as a result of the discourse of human rights.2 In particular, the relatively
novel use of civil and criminal accountability in domestic courts for international crimes can
be seen to challenge not only the primacy of the state, but the basic principle of noninterference in internal affairs that is often considered central to the functioning of
international society. I will seek in this essay to assess this general claim, which is often made
with relatively little empirical support, through the examination of such civil and criminal
cases. I find that while significant inroads in the traditional preserve of sovereignty have
indeed been made by human rights litigation, there is also significant backlash and
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countervailing trends that suggest that these inroads ought not be overstated.
This article examines human rights claims as a challenge to state primacy in
international affairs in the context of claims made through criminal accountability via the
exercise of universal jurisdiction, and civil accountability through the use of the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) in the US. I examine how prosecutions for serious human rights
violations using universal jurisdiction challenge the state in two senses: they constitute a
direct challenge to state actors and state policy, and, while they take place in state courts, can
be filed by individuals. These two developments undermine the two primary protections
that states (and their agents) have so often been able to invoke: the inviolability of state
agents and the virtual unchallengeability of internal state behavior, and the rule that only
states might have standing in international law. While the development of human rights and
international humanitarian law since the end of the Second World War have driven these
two changes, I will not examine that historical trajectory in detail, as that has been
thoroughly addressed by many authors elsewhere. Rather, I will focus primarily on the way
in which the use of universal jurisdiction exemplifies and perhaps expands this trend.
Similarly, the protection of immunity has been increasingly limited as against civil cases as
well, and I discuss this in the context of cases under the Alien Tort Claims Act in the US and
civil cases for torture in the UK. However, I note that this trend is not without critics, and
not irreversible. I thus examine the challenges that have been raised against universal
jurisdiction, and some countervailing trends in international law that seek to firmly situate
the state as the primary actor. These are the recent International Law Commission Draft
Articles on State Responsibility and the challenges to autonomous international criminal
courts, with the concomitant emphasis on local justice.
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Human rights as a challenge to the primacy of the state
The rise of human rights discourse and instruments has arguably significantly challenged
state sovereignty in the sense that the black box of sovereignty or the state can be opened
up: states can be called to task for activities that are purely internal, at least in some
instances. A more radical argument has run that human rights do more than challenge
sovereignty--they re-define it--sovereignty is defined not as state or popular sovereignty, but
rather state compliance with human rights norms establishes state legitimacy or lack of it.3
This line of argumentation challenges the pure statist logic common to the disciplines of
international relations and international law, which would have it that human rights are
either agreed to by cynical states with no intention of upholding them, or actually constitute
a somewhat dangerous challenge to the bases of international order.4 Instead, it is suggested,
constraints of state jurisdiction do matter, but so too do other conceptions, such as naturalist
conceptions of rights as inhering in individuals, transnational conceptions of society, etc.
These theoretical foundations may be buttressed by empirical claims about effective
implementation of human rights. Such empirical claims are not always fully elaborated,
although they are becoming more common; this essay seeks to contribute to these.5

Conception of state and state actor inviolability
Traditional respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of citizenship: migrants and post-national membership in Europe
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); see also, for a less radical argument but one
that nonetheless views state legitimacy through the treatment of citizens, Thomas Franck,
“The emerging right to democratic governance” American Journal of International Law vol. 86
(1992), p. 46.
4 See Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier
Publishers, 1981), chapters 1 and 3, articulating this line of logic and challenging it.
5 An example might be Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, “The Impact of the United
Nations human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level,” Human Rights Quarterly vol. 23
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affairs are well established in the international legal and political systems, enshrined clearly in
the UN Charter. While states have engaged in ever-more elaborate bilateral and multilateral
agreements, many of these are not directly enforceable, either in domestic courts or
international courts, although as we shall see below this trend is changing. Thus, for
example, while as early as 1900 the US Supreme Court declared that “international law is
part of our law”, the Court has notoriously been loath to apply international law and
standards absent clear implementing legislation, and particularly wary of applying customary
international law.6 The same may be said of many other countries as well. The prevailing
expectation is that set forth in the UN Charter, article 2(4), preventing the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of member states, and article
2(7), preventing interference in essentially internal matters of states. While these absolute
restrictions, as discussed below, have been eroded over time by human rights norms and
other developments, it is worth noting that even the enforcement of those norms, discussed
below, remains limited by practices and doctrines developed to protect states and state
actors, in part to ensure international comity and avoid conflicts. This includes sovereign
and diplomatic immunity and act of state and similar doctrines. It is important, then, to
understand the primary barriers to legal actions against states or their officials in
international law, which may often be raised as bars to human rights cases.

Challenging states: some limits in practice
This section will examine several limits to the possibility of challenging internal state
action, whether in the courtrooms of another state or in international tribunals: sovereign
(2001), pp. 483-535.
6 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “International law,
Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International
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and diplomatic immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the general absence of standing for
individuals before international bodies.
Sovereign and diplomatic immunity
Under international law, states have certain immunities from legal action, specifically
from the exercise of jurisdiction. These immunities may hold in civil or criminal cases,
although as we shall see there are some differences. While traditionally these immunities are
understood to be quite broad,7 national legislation may seek to restrict or regulate these
immunities; the US has sought to do so through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) of 1976, and the UK has done so through the State Immunity Act of 1978.8 Other
states have subsequently enacted analogous legislation, but it is the practice of the US and
the UK that will be addressed in this paper on this issue.9 This legislation tends to represent
a move away from an absolute conception of immunity to a more pragmatic balancing act,
considering the ramifications of a failure to allow the exercise of jurisdiction. This approach
is known as the restrictive approach to immunity.10 It is worth noting, however, that in
recent litigation, the European Court of Human Rights declined to override state immunity
in a case alleging human rights violations.11
Law Debate,” American Journal of International Law vol. 98, no. 1 (January 2004), pp. 91-108.
7 For an early US Supreme Court case representing absolute immunity, see The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812).
8 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 Stat. 2891, 28 USCA 1330, 1332, 1391,1441, 1602-11, as
amended by Pub.L. 100-640, 102 Stat. 3333 (1988); State Immunity Act 26 & 27 Eliz. 2, Ch. 33,
17 I.L.M. 1123.
9 Canada, Pakistan, Australia, Singapore, and South Africa are examples of states with similar
legislation: see Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit,
International Law: Cases and Materials 3d ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Group, 1993), p.
1127.
10 Henkin, et. al., International Law p. 1127.
11 In so doing, it rejected the emerging “normative hierarchy theory”, which suggests that
because the norm against torture is a jus cogens norm and state immunity is not jus cogens, the
torture claim ranks higher, hierarchically. Lee M. Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights,
and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory,” American Journal of
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In the US, the primary exception to sovereign immunity under the FSIA has been
the so-called commercial exception, whereby foreign states are not immune from suit in
relation to their commercial activities; precisely what constitutes a commercial activity has
been extensively litigated.12 The FSIA itself thus constituted an exception to absolute
immunity, but for commercial torts, not for non-commercial ones, such as torture or other
bodily harm as we shall see below.13
To that end, certain federal courts in the US began to interpret the Alien Tort Claims
Act to serve as a basis for jurisdiction for civil claims against agents of foreign states acting
in an official capacity. The Alien Tort Claims Act was passed by the First Congress of the
US in 1789, and establishes federal district court jurisdiction over “all causes where an alien
sues for a tort only [committed] in violation of the law of nations.”14 In the absence of
legislative history, commentators are uncertain what the original purpose of this provision
was, but some analyses suggest it was meant to address piracy, slave-trading, and attacks on
foreign diplomats.15 The act thus enables claims to be brought civilly for certain acts; victims
may seek reparation, but criminal charges cannot be brought.16
International Law vol. 97, no. 4 (October 2003, pp. 741-81.
12 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc 504 US 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992),
US LEXIS 3542.
13 Siderman v. The Republic of Argentina, et al. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir., 1992).
14 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, sec. 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. 1350.
15 See generally Ralph Steinhardt and Anthony D’Amato, eds., (London: Transnational
Publishers, 1999); Kenneth C. Randall, “Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute,” New York Univeristy Journal of International Law and
Policy, vol. 18 (1985), p. 1; Paul Hoffman, “Civil litigation of corporate behavior in conflict
zones: the US Alien Tort Claims Act,” in Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, eds.,
Peaceful Profits: Approaches to Managing the Resource Dimensions of Armed Conflict (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 2004); Anne-Marie Burley, “The Alien Tort Claims
Statute and Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor,” American Journal of International Law,
vol. 83 (1989), p. 461; Terry Collingsworth, “The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 15 (Spring 2002), p. 183.
16 The ATCA is not the only tool to impose civil liability for international crimes: see
generally John F. Murphy, “Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an
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The Act was invoked very infrequently for nearly 200 years, until 1980, when a
federal court issued an historic decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, a case brought against a
police inspector general arising out of the torture and murder of Joelito Filartiga.17 In
Filartiga, the Court of Appeals considered and rejected the defense that the law of nations
could not, for the purposes of the statute, include human rights complaints; it found instead
that such law would include existing law at the time of the events rather than of the
enactment of the statute. The court further found that the ban on torture had become part
of customary international law. Subsequent jurisprudence has established extrajudicial
execution, disappearances, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and genocide as acts
contrary to the law of nations for the purposes of interpreting the statute.18
The Filartiga line of cases allowed individuals to bring suit in US courts against
foreign officials. However, it remained unclear whether the ATCA and these cases would
allow for jurisdiction over foreign states for tortious acts under the law of nations. In
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, the US Supreme Court had occasion to
consider this issue.19 The court there determined that the FSIA was the sole legal basis to
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court, and that, therefore, unless the case
against the state could be made under an FSIA exception, the case, currently framed as
deriving jurisdiction from the ATCA, could not proceed.
Similar issues have arisen in the UK with regard to state and state official immunity
Alternative to Criminal Prosecution,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 12 (Spring 1999) pp.
1-56.
17 Filartiga v. Peña-Irala US Ct. App., 2nd Cir., 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
18 A few salient cases, some of which continue in litigation, include Kadic v. Karadzic, US Ct.
App., 2nd Cir.70 F.3d 232 (1995); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F. 3d 88 (2000); Doe v.
Unocal, 248 F. 3d 915 2001); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4085 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
19 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 US 428, 109 SCt 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818
(1989).
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against civil torts claims. The UK does not have a statute analogous to the ATCA, but has
had occasion to hear civil cases against foreign state officials in respect of torture cases, in
circumstances similar than those that give rise to many ATCA cases. In October 2004, the
Supreme Court of Judicature issued a decision regarding immunity in two civil cases
involving alleged torture by foreign states and officials. In both cases, Jones v. The Ministry of
the Interior and Mitchell v. Al-Dali, British and/or Canadian citizens alleged torture at the
hands of Saudi officials, and instituted civil cases for damages arising from the alleged
torture, including “aggravated and exemplary damages for assault and battery, trespass to the
person, torture and unlawful imprisonment.”20
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sought to challenge the claims on the grounds of
immunity under the State Immunity Act 1978 of the UK.21 The courts in earlier proceedings
had upheld the immunity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself, findings which the court in
Jones confirmed. The court carefully considered claims that there had occurred some
relaxation of standards of official immunity, focusing particularly upon the distinction
between official acts and acts which could not be viewed as in pursuit of official functions,
and the distinction between official and private acts, before turning to the crime of torture,
which is by definition an act that occurs in an ‘official’ capacity.22 A review of relevant
precedent including the Pinochet cases led the court to the conclusion that official immunity
rationae materiae could not preclude prosecution for systematic torture. However, because the
cases at hand involved civil liability, the extent of civil immunity had also to be considered.
Jones v. The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al Arabiya as Saudia (The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia) & Anor. Case Numbers A2 2003/2155 & A2 2004/0489 (Supreme Court of
Judicature, United Kingdom) (28 October 2004), available at
http://www.redress.org/news/Jones%20v%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf,
para 1.
21 Jones v. the Ministry of the Interior para 5.
22 Jones v. the Ministry of the Interior paras 44-53.
20
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Examining dicta in relevant criminal cases, as well as Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, and other US
practice, the court concluded that while the Saudi government might be immune from civil
suits, the officials themselves could not be. The court concluded, after considering issues
such as forum non conveniens, that while such a conclusion did not empower English courts to
act in all such cases, upon engaging in a balancing act considering all relevant issues, an
English court could do so.23
While the Filartiga and Jones lines of cases meant that former state officials could face
civil charges for acts committed in the official line of duty, it is important to recognize that
these cases did not allow for suits against currently serving heads of state or diplomatic
representatives. The FSIA does not deal directly with this issue, although as we shall see
below the ICJ case DRC v. Belgium did address the issue. However, customary international
law as well as a web of bilateral and multilateral conventions do address diplomatic, consular,
and state official immunity.24 The fundamental reason for these protections are relatively
obvious—they are meant to ensure that states are not hampered in their foreign relations,
and to ensure stability in diplomatic and therefore international relations. The concern to
protect diplomats and foreign officials, then, is driven by a concern that the arrest or seizure
of their assets would lead to diplomatic conflict; therefore only a state might judge the acts
of its own officials.25 As we shall see, similar immunities protect foreign officials against
Jones v. the Ministry of the Interior paras 92-99.
See, inter alia Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 23 UST 3227, TIAS 7502, 500
UNTS 95 signed 18 April 1961, entry into force 24 April 1964 (for the US 13 December 1972).
American Diplomatic Relations Act 22 USCA 254a-e available at
http://assembler.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00000254---a000.html; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 596 UNTS 261, 21 UST 77, TIAS no. 6820;
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1 UNTS 15, 21 UST 1418, TIAS
No. 6900 (13 February 1946); see also the American International Organizations Immunities Act
22 USCA 288a-e.
25 Letter of 16 March 1906 from US Secretary of State Elihu Root to the US Secretary of
Commerce and Labor, excerpted in Henkin, et al International Law pp. 1200-1201.
23
24
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criminal suits, for so long as they are in office.

Act of state doctrine
In the United States, a further limitation to actions against foreign states exists: the
Act of State doctrine. This is a judge-made doctrine, developed by the US Supreme Court,
that limits the effect of international law in US courts in cases brought against foreign states.
This doctrine was developed to ensure a respect for foreign states, but has been used to
prevent the exercise of jurisdiction in cases against states even where those states’ actions
clearly constitute violations of international law. The rationale for this doctrine is similar to
that of foreign sovereign immunity—a desire to avoid judicial interference in the foreign
affairs of the nation. This, as the court recognized in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, was
not required by international law but arose out of US federalism and concern to avoid
excessive interference in one branch of government by another. 26 However, while the
doctrine is particular to, and arises from, the US Constitution, the underlying principle is not
unknown elsewhere.

Restriction of legal standing before international courts to states
Traditionally, it has been understood that not only is it only states that can create
international law, but also that only states have standing before international courts. This
arises from a more general understanding of international law as applicable between states,
or between states and their own citizens; if there is no recourse domestically for the latter
relationship, there is also no recourse internationally. This remains in large part the case
even today. Only states have standing before the International Court of Justice, for example,

26

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 376 US 398, 84 SCt 923, 11 L.Ed. 2d 804 (1964).
10

although organs of the United Nations such as the General Assembly do have the authority
to request advisory opinions of the court. While individuals may be the subjects of
international law, attracting individual criminal responsibility for acts such as war crimes and
genocide, there are few fora where individuals may bring suit themselves. However, this
does not mean that there are no fora in which individuals have standing.

Challenges to state authority
Universal jurisdiction and civil actions as a challenge
Universal jurisdiction and civil cases such as those under ATCA are challenges to
state action and actors, casting light and judgment upon state policies and simultaneously
establishing that certain acts cannot be shielded by doctrines such as those of immunity or
act of state.
Cases whereby states exercise universal jurisdiction constitute more significant
challenges to state sovereignty, whereby one state, usually prompted by actions by activists
or by victims themselves, challenges the internal actions of another state.
“Under the principle of universal jurisdiction a state is entitled or even required to
bring proceedings in respect of certain serious crimes, irrespective of the location of the
crime, and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”27 It can be applied
only a very limited number of crimes. These include war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture; it is sometimes said to include slavery and for historical reasons
encompasses piracy. The cases brought against Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in Spain and the
International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law and
Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights
Offenses (2000), p. 2. On the infringement upon sovereignty, see Brad R. Roth, “Liberalism,
Anti-Sovereigntism and Excesses in the Drive Against Impunity,” Finnish Yearbook of
International Law vol. XII (2001). See also Maria Luisa Bartolomei, “Universal Jurisdiction
versus National Sovereignty—Implementing Human Rights in a Global World—Some
examples from Latin America,” paper presented at the annual conference of the Law and
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case filed against Ariel Sharon in Belgium are only the most famous examples of the use of
universal jurisdiction to seek to obtain custody of a defendant for crimes committed far from
the nation and court seeking to try him or her.28
The exercise of universal jurisdiction may constitute a significant challenge to
national sovereignty and may constitute a deviation from the principle, enshrined in Article
2(7) of the UN Charter, of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Jurisdiction has
historically been closely tied to territorial sovereignty, with quite limited exceptions for
extraterritorial application.29 With the exception of universal jurisdiction, extraterritorial
application of jurisdiction has tended to require a nexus with the state seeking to hear a case.
There are four other commonly cited bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction: territorial, basing
jurisdiction upon the place where the offence was committed or had its effects; national,
based upon the nationality of the offender; protective, based upon injury to the national
interest; and passive personal, based upon the nationality of the victim.30
Significant or high-profile cases have included those brought against Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte in Spain and elsewhere, those filed against Israeli President Ariel Sharon in
Society Association (Budapest, 2001).
28 For a broad survey of recent cases, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Contemporary practice
of universal jurisdiction: disjointed and disparate, yet developing,” International Journal of
Human Rights vol. 6 (Fall 2002). The Belgian case against Sharon was dropped on the
grounds that a case could only be carried out against persons found on Belgian territory.
“War Crimes Charges Against Sharon Dropped,” The New York Times online (26 June 2002),
at http://www.nytimes.com; “Belgian court ruling throws doubt on Sharon trial,” Ha’aretz
(16 April 2002), at http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/.
29 For a fuller articulation of the relationship between sovereignty and the jurisdictional
powers to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The history of
universal jurisdiction and its place in international law,” in Macedo, ed., Universal jurisdiction.
See also Ellen S. Podgor. “Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Replacing ‘Objective
Territoriality’ with ‘Defensive Territoriality’,” paper presented at the annual conference of
the Law and Society Association (Vancouver, 2002).
30 United States v. Yunis, Pretrial Memorandum Order No. 4; see generally Thomas M. Franck
and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials, and
Simulations, 2d. ed. (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, MN, 1993) 212-215.
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Belgium, those filed and then abandoned against former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré,
and many more.31 Of particular note is that these were high-profile challenges not simply to
acts within states, but to official acts carried out by heads of state. While the Sharon case
has been dropped for the duration of his tenure as a head of state, and the issue of immunity
was never litigated in relation to Habré, the UK courts did not recognize Pinochet’s claim to
former head of state immunity. The Law Lords initially found that ex head of state immunity
could not be found for acts such as torture, hostage-taking, and other grave international
crimes. For unrelated reasons that initial decision was overturned; the Law Lords
subsequently held that while ex-heads of state did enjoy immunity in the U.K. with respect
to the exercise of official functions, torture could not be viewed as an official function.32
Thus the claim against Pinochet could have proceeded, as it was not barred by immunity;
Pinochet was returned to Chile on other grounds.

ATCA cases and civil cases in the UK have already been discussed above and will be
addressed briefly. Increasingly, defenses of state immunity, or bars such as the Act of State
doctrine in the US, are viewed as illegitimate defenses to charges of torture and other serious
violations of human rights because, it is argued, such activities cannot be viewed as
legitimate instruments of state policy. As already discussed above in the context of the
ATCA, former officials are not allowed to claim immunity in civil cases. Similarly, federal
courts in the US have found that the Act of State doctrine is not a bar to a civil suit against
For a survey see Chandra Lekha Sriram “Exercising Universal Jurisdiction: Contemporary
Disparate Practice,” International Journal of Human Rights vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 2002).
32 Judgment: In Re Pinochet (Oral judgment: 17 December 1998; Reasons: 15 January 1999),
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office/; Judgment--Regina v. Bartle and the
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v. Evans and Another and
the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis Ex Parte Pinochet (24 March 1999), available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office/, reprinted in 38 ILM 581 (1999).
31
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officials for torture. It is worth noting, however, that in the relevant cases the acts of torture
were not clearly authorized by the foreign state’s law itself; were they authorized or
specifically required by the foreign state itself it remains unclear whether an act against the
state could proceed under the act of state doctrine.33

Standing of individuals in international law
While the traditional conception of international law presumes that only states can
be subjects, and thus only states have rights and obligations, and the possibility of enforcing
these or being subject to enforcement action, the rise of human rights discourse and
agreement has meant that this is increasingly not the case. Individuals have standing to
make claims against states for violations of rights in a variety of fora , indirectly and,
increasingly, directly. For example, while individuals cannot petition the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights directly, they can file a complaint before the Inter-American
Commission, which can forward this complaint to the Court for action. Individuals can
petition the European Court of Human Rights directly, and individual petitions to the court
now number in the thousands, far exceeding the inter-state complaints before that body.34
Individuals also have standing before the European Court of Justice, and optional protocols
to the ICCPR and CEDAW permit individuals and groups to submit petitions. The Torture
Convention and the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination also have optional individual complaint procedures. Finally, as already
discussed, individuals can bring civil cases under ATCA in the US or under universal
jurisdiction in several countries. In some states such as Belgium individuals can not only
Forti v. Suarez-Mason 672 F.Supp 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987). Filartiga also found that
unauthorized torture by a foreign official could not be properly treated as an act of state. .
34 European Court of Human Rights, “Case Law Information Notes,” at
33
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bring complaints for prosecutors to carry out, but can act as parties civiles to bring cases on
their own behalf.35

Countervailing trends
While the trends detailed above may lead to the implication that state sovereignty is
progressively being eroded by human rights claims in national courts, whether civil or
criminal, and by implication perhaps that international courts may also erode sovereignty,
these claims ought not be overstated. I note in particular three developments that might
suggest a backlash by states: the US challenges to the International Criminal Court, the
challenges at the ICJ by the Democratic Republic of Congo to cases against its officials
through the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Belgium and France, and the latest draft
articles on state responsibility by the International Law Commission.
The US v. the ICC
The American objections to the International Criminal Court have been public and
vehement, and are viewed by many as but another instance of American exceptionalism.
This may well be, but it is also important to note that US objections are also couched in
more familiar language of state sovereignty, and claim that domestic rather than foreign or
international courts ought to have jurisdiction over a state’s citizens. As is well known the
US has used a number of tools to protect its citizens, and in particular its troops in
peacekeeping operations, from possible jurisdiction of the ICC. In addition to “unsigning”
the treaty the US has used so-called “Article 98” agreements and renewal of peacekeeping
mandates to attempt to eliminate possible avenues of court jurisdiction. It has done so
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/InfoNotesAndSurveys.htm.
35 Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 108.
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because, while jurisdiction is consent-based and the US clearly has not consented, the court
has jurisdiction over any cases arising on the territory of a state party, even if committed by a
non-state party.36 Article 98 agreements refer to that article of the ICC Statute, which seeks
to ensure that provisions for jurisdiction do not undermine previous bilateral agreements
regarding jurisdiction of foreign nationals, usually included in agreements regarding military
bases. The US has sought, in deviation from the original purpose of this article, to create
new bilateral agreements with states parties to the ICC Statute to ensure that those states will
not surrender US citizens to the Court. The US has also vetoed the renewal of peacekeeping
mission mandates in order to compel the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1422,
deferring investigation of cases involving personnel in UN-authorized operations.37
The DRC v. universal jurisdiction
In April 2000, a Belgian magistrate issued an international arrest warrant, seeking the
detention for extradition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Yerodia Ndombasi for alleged crimes constituting “serious violations of
international law”. The DRC filed a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
contesting Belgium’s jurisdiction and seeking provisional measures to discharge the warrant
immediately. The DRC contended that as there was no evidence of jurisdiction based on
territory, in personam jurisdiction, or harm to the security or dignity of Belgium, grounds for
arrest were lacking and the actions of Belgium violated, inter alia, the principle of sovereign
legal equality. The DRC contended that a variety of multilateral conventions addressing
specific international offenses created universal jurisdiction, but only where the alleged
Madeline Morris, “The Disturbing Democratic Deficit of the International Criminal
Court,” Finnish Yearbook of International Law vol. XII (2001), pp. 109-118.
37 UN Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002); See discussion in Marc Weller,” Undoing
the global constitution: UN Security Council Action on the International Criminal Court,”
International Affairs vol. 78, no. 4 (2002), pp. 693-712.
36
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perpetrator was on the territory of the state seeking jurisdiction; it also asserted diplomatic
immunity for the accused. Belgium requested that the case be removed from the ICJ’s list;
in December the court rejected that request but also refused to take the provisional measure
of discharging the warrant requested by the DRC.
In February of 2002, the court issued its decision in the case.38 Most importantly, it
did not explicitly reject the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Belgium;39 rather it found
that the exercise in this instance was in violation of legal obligations of Belgium towards the
DRC, as it failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by an
incumbent minister under international law. The court did not accept claims that the acts
for which the arrest warrant was issued could not be legal acts within the performance of
official duties, but rather indicated that the warrant would have undermined the conduct of
foreign relations by the minister. The court, thus, issued an order that Belgium cancel the
international arrest warrant. The ramifications of this case will become clearer over time;
certainly it means that the case prepared in Belgium against Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of
Israel cannot go forward while he is in office. The limitation of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by diplomatic immunity has now been clearly articulated, but gray areas remain;
in particular immunities attaching to former diplomats or heads of state for acts undertaken
in office.
France initiated proceedings for torture and crimes against humanity in the DRC’s
(formerly Zaire) neighbor, the Republic of the Congo, under articles 689-1 and 689-2 of the
French Code of Criminal Procedure.40The Republic of the Congo challenged attempts to
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium) measures), (ICJ, Order of 14 February 2002), General List No. 121
39 Indeed Congo’s final submissions withdrew the broader objection to universal jurisdiction
and emphasized the immunity of foreign ministers.
40 See Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France) 2003 I.C.J.
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undertake investigations against, inter alia, the sitting President, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and
sought provisional measures to compel France to suspend these judicial proceedings. The
case poses a more direct challenge to universal jurisdiction than the DRC v. Belgium
proceedings in which the DRC challenged the legality of the arrest warrant but dropped the
objections regarding the legality of the arrest warrant as a part of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. In its case against France, the Republic of the Congo has argued that a sitting
head of state, or cabinet minister such as the Minister of the Interior (also a subject of
investigations in France), is immune from any ‘act of authority’ by another state that would
hinder them in the exercise of their duties, and further that the ‘unilateral’ exercise by a state
of universal jurisdiction is a violation of the sovereign equality enshrined in article 2(1) of the
UN Charter.
On 17 June 2003, the ICJ rejected the request by the Republic of the Congo for an
order for a provisional measure. The court rejected claims by the Congo that immediate
measures were necessary in order to prevent irreparable prejudice to the accused or the
Congo, or damage to French-Congolese relations, largely on the grounds that Congo had
failed to provide concrete evidence of such harm.41 The court reasoned that since French
law recognizes the immunities of heads of state, there could be no urgent concern that a case
would go forward against the sitting president, and that the other individuals being
investigated had yet to be the subject of any proceedings. The order at this provisional
measures stage did not address the direct challenge to universal jurisdiction raised by the
application of the Republic of the Congo.
129, Requete et Demande D’indication de Mesure Provisoire (5 December 2001), at www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icoforder/icof_application_20020209.pdf; see also Pieter
H.F.Bekker, “Prorogated and universal jurisdiction in the international court: The Congo v.
France,” (April 2003) at www.asil.org/insights/insigh103.htm.
41 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France) 2003 I.C.J. 129 (17
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ILC draft articles
Since its initial report in 1956, the International Law Commission has been engaged
in codification of the principles of state responsibility, which enumerate types of harms by
and against states that are wrongful, and actions that may be taken in response. While at one
time it was contemplated that such acts might be denoted not merely as harms or as
wrongful, but as crimes, the most recent articles by the ILC do not so denote them.42 What
is noteworthy about the articles for the purposes of this essay is that, contra the trends
towards individual standing discussed above, the articles remain firmly state-focused.43 Only
states can invoke the responsibility of another state for violations of obligations, under the
articles. This is the case even though the articles refer to those obligations as obligations to
the international community as a whole, rather than, as noted by one eminent scholar, the
international community of states as a whole.44 This approach, focusing upon harms to states,
thus deviates from an earlier set of draft articles, completed in the 1960s, that emphasized
injury to alien persons and property; individuals would not then have gained standing but
would have been the subject of harms generating claims by states.45 What this implies is
some recognition of actors other than states as possessors of rights that may be harmed,
even though only states may then complain. It is worth noting, however, that states that are
not harmed may complain of violations. Any such harms or violations would be cause for
June 2003) at www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icoforder/icof_order_20030617.pdf.
42 “Draft Articles of Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session UN GAOR, 56th Session, Supp.
No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), on the turn away from the language of criminality see
Anthony Lang, 2004 ISA paper.
43 Daniel Bodansky and John R. Crook, “Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibiltiy
Articles: Introduction and Overview,” American Journal of International Law vol. 96, no. 4
(October 2002), pp. 773-91, p. 790.
44 Edith Brown Weiss, “Invoking state responsibility in the Twenty-First Century,” American
Journal of International Law vol. 96, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 798-816, 804.
45 David J. Bederman, “Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first century,” American
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civil rather than criminal action; states can lodge claims for reparations.46 States can also
initiate non-forceful countermeasures; the ILC discussions centered around specific features
of application, in particular proportionality.47 At the moment the Articles exclude the
possibility of individual action, and it seems unlikely that this will change in the near future.
As one commentator noted,
“The exclusion of individuals and international organizations from the scope of the articles
was a relatively uncontroversial move, but it could be criticized for a lack of vision. Does it
really make sense to hermetically seal state responsibility from that of other international
actors, particularly at a time when nonstate actors are gaining in strength, power, prestige,
and legitimacy? Ultimately all this may well matter the most at the intersection of state
power, individual rights, and countermeasures.”48
Backlash and demands for local justice
It is not only the United States, with its campaign against the ICC, or the DRC, with its
challenges to universal jurisdiction at the ICJ, that have raised challenges to the use of
specific tools such as universal jurisdiction and, more generally, international tribunals, to
pursue cases challenging state violation of international human rights or humanitarian law
abroad. The statute of the ICC rightly recognizes the principle of complementarity, just as
the European Court of Human Rights preserves the principle of subsidiarity.49 This is the
case not merely because of state fear of intrusion into internal affairs, or judgment of their
own abuses, but because such power could be wielded for political purposes rather than
Journal of International Law vol. 96, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 817-32, p. 829.
46 Dinah Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility,”
American Journal of International Law vol. 96, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 833-56.
47 Bederman, “Invoking State Responsibility”.
48 Bederman, “Invoking State Responsibility”, p. 829 (citations omitted).
49 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, preamble and article 1, at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/; as discussed by Leila Nadya Sadat, “complementarity has a
substantive component, a procedural component, and a component that we may think of as
‘political’ or ‘prudential’”; the last element is of greatest concern for us here. See Sadat, The
International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New
Millennium (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), p. 119.
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“justice”, and thus might merit some real constraints. This is noted by even such advocates
of human rights and more humane governance as Richard Falk, who notes that those with
the greatest capacity to act to protect rights are also those likely to have ulterior motives or
other agendas.50 Such concerns may rightly arise with respect to tools of civil and criminal
accountability. To the degree that proceedings take place only in the courts of powerful
Western states, and often in those of former colonizers, the argument that cases are
selective, and even driven by imperialistic agendas, can be and has been raised. This has
been raised by, for example, the International Law Association, an independent association
of international legal experts with no particular political affiliation or preference based in
London:
“…the decision to initiate proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction may be objected
to. States exercising universal jurisdiction on this basis may be accused of jurisdictional
imperialism because universal jurisdiction is only likely to be exercised in powerful states
with regard to crimes committed in less powerful states.”51
Such concerns may naturally be overstated, but are worth noting in that they comprise a
supplement to more obviously cynical objections to legal action challenging internal actions
by sovereign states. One reader has suggested, for example, that the tools described in this
paper might be turned to the “war on terror” with troubling consequences.52
One outcome of suggestions that international justice is, alternately, too invasive,
potentially imperialistic, or simply fails to have specific desired effects has been the
development of alternate, hybrid forms of justice. I will not discuss these in detail here as I
have done elsewhere; suffice to say that hybrid forms of justice, such as the mixed tribunals
Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, p. 36.
International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law and
Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights
Offenses (2000), pp. 19-20.
52 I am grateful to Anthony Lang for this point.
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in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere, involve the use of local and international law,
and local and international justice, in venues based in countries affected by human rights
violations and mass atrocities. They also, by design, include the participation of states that
may themselves have been involved in atrocities, but may be seen as distinct from traditional
transitional justice, which might involve little or no international interference.53
Trying Saddam: the Special Case of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
The Special Tribunal established to try Saddam Hussein can be viewed as an attempt
to pursue justice domestically, and in a state-oriented tribunal rather than accept any real
international interference or participation by individuals. Iraq is not, of course, a “typical”
transitional state with a negotiated transition; the transitional regime is a new one installed by
force, and thus decisions about accountability could be taken by the state alone. There is no
reason, a priori, why Hussein and his fellow Ba’athists could not be tried before an ad hoc
tribunal like those created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or a mixed tribunal such
as those created or in creation in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. 54
However, such devices were rejected in favor of a domestic tribunal. This does not in itself
make the tribunal illegitimate—far from it—but may generate concerns about the conduct
of trials. Rather it is important to note that the Tribunal, constituted as it is of Iraqis and
with US support, but little general international participation, was not the only possible
model: alternatives such as an ad hoc or mixed tribunal have already been mentioned. Cases
might also have been brought through the tools discussed in this chapter, allowing
individuals to bring civil or criminal claims in the courts of other states, or cases through
See, for example, on challenges to universal jurisdiction specifically as potentially
illegitimate or imperialistic, Sriram, “Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past
Abuses,” American University International Law Review vol. 19, no. 2 (Winter 2003).
54 See Diane F. Orentlicher, “Venues for Prosecuting Saddam Hussein: The Legal
Framework,” ASIL Insights (December 2003) at www.asil.org/insights/insigh124.htm; Amy
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Iraqi courts. It is perhaps notable then that this is a state-controlled exercise in two senses—
the absence of individual claimants and the relative absence of international participation. It
is certainly the case that, should the trials meet international standards, domestic courts
elsewhere would, following the principle of ne bis in idem, be unable to pursue criminal cases,
and might well decline to examine civil cases, although these would not necessarily be
prohibited.
The Iraqi Governing Council adopted the a statute for an Iraqi Special Tribunal in
December of 2003; the Tribunal was authorized to prosecute genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes perpetrated during the period 1968-2003. In April 2004, the Iraqi
Governing Council announced the creation of the tribunal to try Hussein and others from
his regime.55 The tribunal came under swift attack by human rights organizations for its
composition and its potential use of the death penalty. The latter is beyond the scope of this
inquiry, but the appointment of the nephew of the head of the Iraqi National Congress
political party raised immediate concerns by advocates that the trials might be politically
driven, even constitute a ‘kangaroo court’ or victors’ justice.56 Further, while some
international actors will be engaged, including on Hussein’s defense staff, the composition of
the tribunal’s prosecutors and judges is entirely Iraqi, although the Statute had permitted the
use of some non-Iraqi judges. Further, the investigative support that has been offered
internationally was provided by the United States, by a team of some 50 investigators from
various agencies of the US Department of Justice, which may further to contribute to
Ross, “The Trial of Saddam Hussein,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution (16 December 2003).
55 See generally United States Institute of Peace, “Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal:
Lessons from Experiences in International Criminal Justice,” Special Report 122 (June 2004),
at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr122.html.
56 Robert Collier, “’Human rights shortcomings’ in Hussein Tribunal--Concern Grows that
Trial Will be Seen as a Kangaroo Court,” San Francisco Chronicle (22 April 2004), at
www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/iraq/2004/0422short.htm.
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concerns about bias.57 At the reading of the charges against him in mid-2004, Hussein
certainly emphasized his claim that the court was illegitimate: while his claims are clearly
driven by interest there may be cause for concern.58
It would be unrealistic to expect that the previously corrupt, and largely destroyed,
Iraqi justice system, could handle cases of such magnitude on its own. The knowledge of,
much less practice in, international human rights or humanitarian law by domestic judges
and lawyers was said to be non-existent.59 The Tribunal proposes to address these limits in
part by drawing upon the Iraqi exile community, some of whom are qualified jurists.
However, critics contend that simply bringing back Iraqi exiles will not solve the problem,
but rather bring in competing political agendas. Concerns about the court are compounded
by the absence of some key protections of international human rights law, including that the
judges and prosecutors working on cases have expertise in human rights or complex criminal
cases.60 An advisory meeting for the Iraqi judges and prosecutors on the tribunal confirmed
these fears: even the Iraqi participants themselves acknowledged their lack of expertise.
Further, the UN barred its own experts from participation in the meeting on the grounds
that it did not meet international standards.61 Certainly, whether the trials are fairly
conducted or not, the Special tribunal stands as a clear instance in which a state sought not
to allow other actors, be they courts of other states or an international court, to examine
“Iraqi tribunal to try Saddam Hussein,” at
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/20/iraq.main; Louis Mexler, “All-Iraqi tribunal
formed to try Hussein: Longtime enemy at head of panel,” Associated Press (21 April 2004)
at www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040421/news_ln21tribunal.html.
58 John F. Burns and Ian Fisher,” “A Defiant Hussein Rejects Charges in Iraqi Court,” New
York Times (1 July 2004) at www.nytimes.com.
59 Paul van Zyl, “Transitional Justice in Iraq: an ICTJ Policy Paper,” (May 2003) at
www.ictj.org.
60 See Human Rights Watch, “Saddam Hussein as a P.O.W.,” (22 January 2004) at
www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/27/iraq7076.htm.
61 Simons, “Iraqis not ready for trials.”
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internal atrocities, much less to allow individual claims against Hussein.

Conclusions
I began this essay with the suggestion that the increased role of the individual in
international law, particularly through human rights claims, had begun to erode state
sovereignty. This is a common enough assertion in international relations and international
legal literature, but is seldom examined in any specific detail. I sought, therefore, to examine
the claim more closely, identifying the traditional place of the state in international law and
the legal protections erected around that state, such as sovereign immunity. I looked as well
as the traditional exclusion of individuals, who have generally not been granted standing in
international law. I then examined two specific legal tools, one civil and one criminal, that
not only empower the individual to bring claims for violations of international law, but to
bring claims against other states. These tools have allowed individuals to make significant
inroads in state sovereignty, but even these have been limited by claims of immunity. It is
worth noting that there has also been a backlash of sorts, against aspects of expansion of
international justice, by the US against the ICC, by the DRC against cases based upon
universal jurisdiction in Belgium, etc. While not constituting backlash per se, the ILC’s 2001
draft articles on state responsibility clearly exclude individuals from claims, despite steps in
an early draft to include them. Similarly, the trial of Saddam Hussein appears to be one in
which significant international involvement might have been expected but over which the
state has sought to maintain firm control.
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